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The crushing defeat of Viktor Orban鈥檚 seemingly entrenched and deeply corrupt political regime in Hungary signifies a massive setback for Russia鈥檚 foreign policy, which reinforces the pattern of failed partnerships and cancelled friendships.

Mainstream commentators in Moscow try to be about this unexpected fiasco in the elections that had been perceived as perfectly controlled, but 鈥減atriotic鈥� bloggers admit that the has sharply contracted. Each setback that has happened in the background of Russia鈥檚 disastrous war against Ukraine is particular, and they are all rooted in the progressing reduction of the resource base, broadly understood, of its foreign policy. Geopolitical contexts of Moscow鈥檚 failures in Latin America, in the Caucasus and in the Middle East are very different, but extra bitterness comes from the fiasco of personal relations that President Vladimir Putin cultivated for years, and Orban certainly makes a special entry point in this track record.

The resonance from the Hungarian , which some compare with the 1989 revolution, is the heaviest for Russia鈥檚 European policy, influenced significantly by Putin鈥檚 of watching the mass demonstrations in Dresden in November 1989.

Three discourses underpin this policy, and Hungary was a major reference point in all of them.

The first one is about the alleged progressive paralysis of the EU bureaucracy and the growing resentment against the a common foreign and security policy among the European states concerned about their national interests. Orban indeed enjoyed performing the role of contrarian in the EU policy-making, and his disappearance can , while restoring the normal flow of funding from Brussels to Budapest. Disagreements among member-states will definitely continue, and the inability to take a on the Gulf war shows yet again the weaknesses of the consensus-based decision-making system, but Moscow will find it much harder to exploit this discord.

The second narrative is about the allegedly irrational 鈥淩ussophobic鈥� attitude in the EU leadership, which stands in the way of and other mutually beneficial ties with Russia. Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, and Kaja Kallas, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, are typically singled out as Russia鈥檚 鈥� and Orban鈥檚 nemeses as well. Kallas is indeed about Russia鈥檚 threat to Europe, but the propaganda efforts to portray her warnings as clashing with the pro-Russian feelings in European societies are patently false. The loud chanting 鈥溾�� (Russians Go Home) in the jubilant crowds in Budapest last Sunday proved it beyond doubt.

The third discourse exaggerates Europe鈥檚 and growing reluctance to continue support for Ukraine, and Hungary certainly was the exhibit one in this self-serving assertion. The lifting of the Hungarian veto on disbursing the 90 billion euro EU aid package to Ukraine is definitely a major blow to Russia鈥檚 goal of prevailing in the war of attrition, which has inflicted to its own economy. Orban鈥檚 attempt to make Ukraine and, , President Volodymyr Zelensky a major issue in his electoral campaign was obviously a blunder, which Kyiv now can exploit for rehabilitating ties with Hungary and resuming the oil flow through the by the end of April. Moscow鈥檚 last hope for slowing down the EU support for Ukraine is Slovakia鈥檚 Prime Minister Robert Fico, who attended the Red Square parade in May 2025, but Orban鈥檚 disappearance leaves him .

What amplifies the impact of the Hungarian setback for Russia is that support for Orban was one of the few issues where Putin and US President Donald Trump were . Trump鈥檚 assault on Venezuela and the swift removal of President Nicolas Maduro, who had been Putin, was a shock for Moscow, and Russian propaganda that crisis. The on Cuba is loudly condemned, and Moscow even dared to send an for rescuing the ruling regime. In contrast, embracing Orban was for Putin a convenient way to show Trump that they had common ground for political campaigns, even if presently experts in Moscow try to argue that the US involvement was a for the Hungarian fiasco.

In the in Moscow, the interplay between the regime change in Hungary and the unpredictable transformation of the war in the Gulf inevitably comes into focus. The opening salvo in this war, which killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was a , who may be less concerned about the survival of his autocratic regime than the Iranian leadership, but certainly takes personal safety very seriously. He opted against granting Iran any tangible support, even humanitarian aid, and this a strategic partner in distress undercuts Russia鈥檚 ability to make a difference in resolving this conflict. The post-war reconfiguration of security and economic ties may amount to a , the course of which is too complex to chart now, but Russia can hardly find profitable opportunities. One feature that is already clear is that Putin鈥檚 design for combining personal networks with promoting such organisations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS has , since Iran鈥檚 membership in both (from 2023 and 2024, respectively) didn鈥檛 help its cause at all.

The erosion of Russia鈥檚 influence in the Middle East goes in parallel with the dismantling of its dominance over the South Caucasus. Putin鈥檚 bitter quarrel with Azerbaijan鈥檚 President Ilham Aliyev dates back to the missile hit on Flight AZAL 8243 over Grozny on 25 December 2024, and Moscow鈥檚 attempts to turn that page have still left the bilateral . Armenia is firmly set to curtail its dependence upon Russia, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan鈥檚 recent visit to Moscow has only added to . Russia鈥檚 retreat from the Caucasus is implicitly driven by its failure to ensure the survival of the al-Assad regime in Syria, and Zelensky is keen to remind about this debacle by making a , President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul.

The pattern of Russian setbacks illuminated so sharply by the game-changing outcome of elections in Hungary is fundamentally established by the course of its unwinnable war against Ukraine. Putin used to claim that Russia controls the initiative, but on the tactical level, it has lost because of the that Ukraine has gained in drone warfare. On the strategic level, Russia is at increasing disadvantage vis-脿-vis the steadily mobilizing and rearming Europe. And on the geopolitical level, Russia can neither position itself as a champion of the anti-Western resistance nor rely on the partnership with China. Ties with Moscow were a toxic liability for Orban, but Putin cannot admit that his cause is lost.

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at 糖心网页版
• This text was first published by