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The shock in Moscow from the February 28 launch of ongoing U.S.鈥揑sraeli strikes on Iran has eased, and extensive Russian commentary has shifted to asserting that superior air power alone cannot guarantee a meaningful victory.

The Russian media claims that Iran is resilient and asserts strong local support for the regime, presenting the U.S. demand for 鈥渦nconditional surrender鈥� as entirely unrealistic (, March 6; , March 7). Pro-Kremlin outlets resolutely condemn the killing of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,聽 portraying his leadership as spiritual and failing to mention his responsibility for extensive repression (, March 1; , March 6). They argue that Iran鈥檚 capacity to absorb air strikes is greater than U.S. President Donald Trump鈥檚 resolve to sustain them (, March 7).

The ambivalence in Russian pundits鈥� opinions is caused by the lack of direction from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin has publicly remained silent about the new war after decrying Khamenei鈥檚 鈥渁ssassination鈥� as a 鈥渃ynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law鈥� in a condolence message (, March 1). Putin is apparently trying to perform a balancing act and confirm Russia鈥檚 commitment to a partnership with Iran without inviting Trump鈥檚 anger amid ongoing talks on Ukraine (, March 5). Putin appears to have taken Khamenei鈥檚 killing very personally. Semyon Slepakov, a popular Russian singer and comedian that the Kremlin branded a 鈥渇oreign agent,鈥� recorded a clip satirizing Putin鈥檚 fear of Khamenei鈥檚 fate, which has become an instant hit on Russian social media (; , March 6). Cultivating rapport with Trump remains hugely important for Putin. The Kremlin is shying away from direct criticism of high-level decision-making in Washington (, March 2).

The Kremlin is allowing the Russian media to speculate about U.S. public opinion about the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran (, March 5). Russian media typically asserts that the U.S. public wants the White House to wrap up combat operations as soon as possible, but that curtailing the duration of the war will make substantive U.S. victory impossible (, March 4; , March 6).

Pro-Kremlin commentators also stress the lack of European consensus on the war, and predict the subsequent erosion of trans-Atlantic unity (, March 3). Russian pundits ridicule the Baltic states鈥� solidarity with the U.S. operation. Separately, French President Emmanuel Macron鈥檚 March 2 announcement of a major shift in France鈥檚 nuclear policy鈥攚hich would establish nuclear security guarantees for Germany and other European allies鈥攈as aroused concern in Moscow (, March 2; , March 7). The Kremlin often takes Macron鈥檚 rhetoric with a big grain of salt, but this nuclear policy change is a definitive sign of Europe鈥檚 growing determination to counter Russia鈥檚 nuclear brinkmanship (, March 2; , March 7).

Many Russian commentators expect a new windfall of oil export revenue because of turmoil in the Persian Gulf. Some Russian experts, however, warn that volatility in the global oil market may be short-lived because of the U.S. public鈥檚 low tolerance for higher gas costs (, March 5; , March 8). One lasting change may be India鈥檚 position on importing oil from Russia. On March 5, the United States issued India a 30-day license to purchase Russian oil, and dozens of Russian 鈥渟hadow fleet鈥� tankers that were drifting in the Arabian Sea have rushed to unload at the Vadinar refinery in Gujarat, India, some even before restrictions were officially eased (, March 6). Even mainstream Russian commentators acknowledge, nevertheless, that any possible increase in oil income would not be enough to eliminate the federal budget鈥檚 deficit that has grown at an unprecedented rate since the Kremlin鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine (, March 6). One impact that offsets the positive trade balance is the interruption of trade routes with the Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, which has become a major logistical hub for Russian imports (, March 5). The Russian supply chains for circumventing Western sanctions, including those that supply materials and technologies to the Russian military-industrial complex, have been disrupted and will be difficult to quickly reassemble (, March 5).

Russian experts are primarily concerned about how the conflagration in the Persian Gulf will impact Putin鈥檚 war against Ukraine. The intensity of on-ground attacks in the Donbas and missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities鈥攅xcept for Russia鈥檚 March 7 strike on Kharkiv鈥攈ave decreased since the February 28 start of the U.S.鈥揑sraeli aerial campaign (, March 6; , March 8). One reason may be the slowing of 鈥渃ommercial鈥� recruitment鈥攁s fewer Russian men are interested in signing contracts to serve in the 鈥渒ill-zone,鈥� even for extra-high bonuses鈥攚hile Russian public support for continuing the war keeps shrinking (, March 3; , March 5). The main reason, however, may be Putin鈥檚 reluctance to irritate Trump while his attention has drifted away from Ukraine, postponing talks on a 鈥減eace deal鈥� (; March 5). Commentators in Moscow have noted that the duo of Trump鈥檚 negotiators, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, conducted talks with Iran that provided a cover-up for preparations for the massive attack, which they argue undermines Russian trust in the U.S.鈥揢kraine鈥揜ussia negotiations format (, March 3). Jingoist Russian bloggers argue that Kyiv鈥檚 expressed support for the U.S. airstrikes on Iran will not help it to obtain Patriot missiles, which are also needed in Kuwait and Qatar, and may erode European support for Ukraine (, March 6).

Russian regime-aligned geopolitical experts predict that Iran will ultimately withstand the U.S.鈥揑sraeli attack. U.S. moves against Russia鈥檚 partners, however, may be dangerous for the Kremlin. Cuba may come under more U.S. pressure, and Russia鈥檚 inability to help its traditional partners would be exposed yet again (see , January 22). Trump may opt to reduce tensions with the People鈥檚 Republic of China and offer to cut tariffs during his visit scheduled for April, shrinking Russia鈥檚 space for political maneuvering. In any case, Putin does not want to be held responsible for taking the side of U.S. adversaries, so reports that the Kremlin is providing intelligence to Iran are certain to be vigorously denied.

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at 糖心网页版
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