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The long-deadlocked Ukraine war has from the start of 2026 changed quite drastically in the tactical, strategic and geopolitical dimensions, but has remained immobile on the diplomatic track.

This discordance between a and the lack of any progress in peace talks came into focus in the first week of June in the indirect but loaded messaging between President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Vladimir Putin. The former published an arguing that it made little sense to wait for the US attention to shift back from over-focussing on Iran and that Europe should be a key participant in new negotiations, and suggesting a face-to-face meeting. The latter countered by stating that Europe because it is entirely on the side of Ukraine and that until the key demand for granting Russia full control over Donbas is met, there is no point in a meeting.

Paradoxically, both antagonists can be right. Putin is right that Europe is not ready to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Russia and cannot even , and that the US contribution is indispensable. Zelensky is more in tune with the changing character of the war, which demands more profound compromises than what the parties were prepared to contemplate a year ago. Putin, in contrast, keeps referring to the 鈥溾�� allegedly reached with Trump at the Alaska summit on 15 August聽 2025, and insists that Europe should acknowledge those. In hindsight, the proposition that the summit where he was treated to a , but not to the promised , was a success appears preposterous. Trump, for that matter, that any understanding on Ukraine鈥檚 withdrawal from the fortresses in the Donetsk region was reached, and even Russian concede that the 鈥渟pirit of Anchorage鈥� has evaporated.

Putin鈥檚 insistence that Russian troops are , so Donbas will inevitably be conquered by force if a deal is not agreed upon, may appear misinformed. 聽The top brass is quite possibly reluctant to report to the commander-in-chief the real situation in the expanding 鈥渒ill-zone鈥�, where Russian forces suffer for miniscule territorial gain. Even if such sober strategic assessments were presented, Putin would most probably refuse to internalize it. Government ministers, for that matter, had tried to inform him, with all due caution, about the depth of crisis in state finances and the imperative to cut expenditures, and he still asserted at the that the economy was in perfect shape. The official data shows a sharp drop in investment activity amounting in the first quarter to 14.3 percent, but Putin declares that there is no 鈥溾�� whatsoever.

There is more to this resolute refusal to reckon with reality than just the typical autocratic belief that iron will and firm hand would prevail over 鈥溾��. Putin where the rules of the world order imposed by the declining West no longer apply, and Russia鈥檚 strategy of subjugating the pro-Western Ukraine makes a unique contribution to the reconfiguration of global governance. In this macro-geopolitical perspective, Russia鈥檚 abundant natural resources grant a big advantage that would compensate for the momentarily contractions in , and the failure of Russian troops to capture the tiny Ukrainian village of just doesn鈥檛 register. The construction of close to the borders with Finland and Norway is, to the contrary, of importance for putting pressure on the hostile European neighbours, even if there are no troops to deploy to the new barracks.

Ukrainian on St. Petersburg both in the morning of the opening of Putin鈥檚 forum and after the closure disagreed with this self-serving world view, but a heavier blow was delivered by Zelensky鈥檚 meeting in London with the leaders of the European 鈥溾�� 鈥� France, Germany, and the UK. The pledges to expand support for Ukraine were in line with previous commitments, but what came as a surprise for Moscow was the for talks on ending the war, described as changing to Ukraine鈥檚 favour. The difference between these firm conditions for ensuring Ukraine鈥檚 security and anchoring it to Europe and the incoherent drafted by the US and Russian negotiators after the Alaska summit shows the newly-gained European confidence in its capacity for managing the security risks emanating from Russia.

惭辞蝉肠辞飞鈥檚 of the London plan was never in doubt, and the key task for the trio of initiators is now to ensure the broadest possible support the framework. The easiest step is to engage with the frontline Nordic-Baltic states, and in particular insists on inclusion in the format. The focus on the Black Sea security needs to be added, and in this regard to the 鈥渢roika鈥� initiatives is crucial. An even more delicate mission is to ensure consent from US for the European leadership in setting the , and a particular addendum to the plan may become necessary for granting President Donald Trump an opportunity to claim ownership of a key part of the deal. The Gulf may be presently covered by a dense fog of neither-war-nor-peace, but in this region can yield important backing for European initiatives, particularly from the UAE, which is a for Russian businesses. Finally, European diplomats can point to the broad compatibility of the London proposal with the for ending the Ukraine war dating back to spring 2023, in which the imperative for a ceasefire was clearly established.

Such coalition of peacemakers can only be a loose assembly, but even the beginning of its gathering around the tight core group can disillusion Putin about stepping back into the river of deal-making with Trump. The Anchorage summit granted him an opportunity that he failed to grasp, and no amount of reflecting can bring it back. His of the European elites as intrinsically hostile to Russia cannot alter the imperative of negotiating with these difficult neighbours on ending the war that has become not only unwinnable but also unsustainable for Moscow. The longer the Kremlin refuses to proceed from the exchange of blunt messages to the inevitably tough bargaining, the worse its opening position becomes.

One popular Russian instruction on policy-making says that if you cannot check a riot, you should take a lead in it. Putin definitely cannot check the drive toward terminating the senseless war, and if he cannot lead the peace process, somebody else will.

• Pavel K Baev is Research Professor at 糖心网页版
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