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The ongoing talks between the US, Russian and Ukrainian teams of negotiators may yet produce a 鈥減eace deal鈥� 鈥� so desired by President Donald Trump 鈥� by the end of the tumultuous year 2025, or at least before the disastrous war comes to the four-year mark.

The deal in question is certain to be described as 鈥渂eautiful鈥� by its US designers, but in fact the pause in hostilities it may yield would be very far from any notion of stability, let alone peace. The ugly features of this arrangement have come through clearly in the leaked memo, which became notorious as the 鈥溾��, even if those now revised talking points couldn鈥檛 possibly qualify as a 鈥減lan鈥�. The scope of revisions remains confidential at the moment of this writing, but the undeniable pro-Russian tilt of the original document, which offended and the majority of , can only be attributed to the outstandingly low quality of US mediation.

The strong drive of the Trump administration for monopolising the role of mediator goes cross-purpose with the desire to preserve and even assert leadership in the Western coalition and to maintain Europe鈥檚 dependency upon the US in the security realm. The point in the list of 28 that suggests opening a 鈥渄ialogue between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues鈥�, is incompatible with the plain fact that the Atlantic Alliance is led by the US, whatever Trump might have against the European allies.聽 For the majority of Russians, the USA is at the top of the , even if the opinion polls may register swings in pro- and anti-American . Following the official stance, the mainstream commentary is to Trump and cautiously critical of the US policy-making, depicting Europe as the 鈥溾��.

This castigation of European elites undercuts their intentions to develop an because the vision of an armistice they may cherish is doomed to be rejected by Moscow as a priori detrimental to Russia鈥檚 interests. Standing firm with Ukraine and embracing President Volodymyr Zelensky, the leaders of key European states refuse to talk with Putin, even though the a new channel of communication make plenty of sense. Reflecting on the bad experience of negotiating that ensured a 鈥渇reezing鈥� of the war in Donbas in early 2015, the European politicians cannot suggest any mediation, with the probable exception of Hungary鈥檚 Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who a Trump-Putin summit in Budapest. Among NATO member-states, only Turkey is well positioned to act as mediator, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan not only has of negotiating with Putin, but also unique achievements in extracting concessions.

Trump, to the contrary, cannot figure out how to outmaneuver Putin and his appointment of Steve Witkoff as the reflects this inability to of the counter-part with whom he met quite a few times. That Witkoff tends to consume uncritically Putin鈥檚 on the 鈥渄eep reasons鈥� of the war having no knowledge of history and geopolitics is only a part of the problem. Another part is the approach to negotiations as commercial bargaining, in which calculations of potential benefits for the USA are mixed with expectations for . For Witkoff, as well as for Trump, the and stands in the way of doing profitable business, so he has no doubts about including into the 鈥�28 points鈥� that 鈥渁ll ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled鈥� (, the word is 鈥渃ontradictions鈥�). The US mediators cannot comprehend that for Putin the war makes a lot of sense because it constitutes a focal point of the between Russia and the West.

The Russian ruler seeks to camouflage this obsession with 鈥渃ivilizational鈥� confrontation in talks with Trump and has found a go-betweener who thinks and speaks in the same terms as Witkoff 鈥� a Kirill Dmitriev. This Kyiv-born and US-educated business executive focuses on the potentially lucrative deals that could be made as the war is put on a pause, and while such ideas as the construction of a are far-fetched, the main proposition on lifting all economic sanctions against Russia answers the urgent need of escaping from the exactly right. Dmitriev apparently produced the first draft of the deal and Putin鈥檚 more experienced aide, Yuri Ushakov, that Witkoff wouldn鈥檛 try to add any disagreeable alterations. Ushakov鈥檚 concerns were proven correct, and if Putin is irked by such propositions in the 鈥�28 points鈥� non-paper as the US security guarantees to Ukraine (ambivalent as they are), the Europeans are angered by the intention to gain control over the 鈥渇rozen鈥� Russian financial assets, which they for re-arming and reconstructing Ukraine.

Dmitriev鈥檚 ignorance in security matters is not his main shortcoming as a mediator, and neither is his with Russia鈥檚 veteran foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. While Witkoff has Trump鈥檚 full confidence, Dmitriev鈥檚 connection with Putin is tenuous at best, and his wife鈥檚 with Putin鈥檚 younger daughter Ekaterina doesn鈥檛 signify an entry pass to the Kremlin鈥檚 court. Putin is increasingly interested in circumventing and breaching the sanctions regime, but his main perspective on the war is not geo-economic, but geo-strategic, with the fundamental aims of subjugating Ukraine and undermining NATO鈥檚 integrity. Lavrov may be sidelined in the ongoing Miami-Moscow-Miami , but he has set his sails firmly on Putin鈥檚 and remains unperturbed by the passions around the exact drawing of the hypothetical ceasefire line.

Putin has deliberately focused his on gaining full control over Donbas knowing how sensitive is the territorial control question for the Ukrainians and how insignificant it appears for the US mediators. In reality, he doesn鈥檛 need the unoccupied twenty per cent of the devastated Donetsk region and cherishes the vision of a Russia-US entente that dissolves the trans-Atlantic unity and leaves Ukraine in limbo. A different team of mediators with a deeper understanding of these ambitions is needed for countering Putin鈥檚 game plan, but still bringing the war to an end.

The arrangement that Trump鈥檚 envoys are hammering out by putting hard pressure on Ukraine and offering various incentives to Putin will constitute a major breach in the European security system, which can only be reinforced by a fast rehabilitation of Ukraine and its firm anchoring to the EU and NATO by reliable security ties.

• Pavel K. Baev is a Research Professor at 糖心网页版
• This text was first published as an opinion pies at