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One of the most noteworthy responses to the election of Donald J. Trump came from politically radical African-Americans. In light of the longue dur茅e of racial supremacy and the experience of those exploited by America鈥檚 economic system, it was not surprising or exceptional that aracist, misogynist, xenophobic plutocrat could succeed the first black President of the United States. In contrast, very many white liberals were stunned that such a man could be elected in 2016. I was reminded of this discrepancy, the absence/presence of shock in response to what was conceived of as either a normal or exceptional event when reflecting on Jacqueline Best鈥檚 provocative on 鈥榚xceptionalism鈥�.

During the 2000s, several 鈥榗ritical security studies鈥� (CSS) scholars turned to theories of 鈥榯he exception鈥� to understand how and why the Bush administration spoke of an 鈥榚mergency鈥�, an 鈥榚xtraordinary鈥�, and 鈥榚xceptional鈥� situation to justify its military and legal choices after the 9.11 attacks. Jacqueline Best鈥檚 ambitious aim is to unify CSS and 鈥榗ultural political economy鈥� through returning the concept of 鈥榚xception鈥� to its original economic roots. Such an account, she hopes, might overcome some criticisms of exceptionalism theory: the too narrow focus on security; neglect of 鈥榣iberal political economy鈥�; and related tendency to ignore the 鈥榮ocial production鈥� of exceptionalism (380).

Best argues that there is a 鈥榮imilar logic at work鈥� in both security and economic exceptionalisms. In both discourses, political and economic elites attempt to define 鈥�the limit of normal politics鈥�, to suspend 鈥�the norm (or the law)鈥�, and then to put 鈥�the exception into practice鈥� (378, 376). As evidence, she refers to 鈥榯he history of economic exceptionalism鈥� (377), which she locates in the late 19th- and early 20th- centuries United States, specifically the government鈥檚 use of martial law to crush labour strikes (381). In addition, there is a brief study of the US government鈥檚 justificatory discourse around the handling of aspects of the 2008 鈥榝inancial crisis鈥�.

An international political economy-centred genealogy of exceptionalism discourse would be most welcome. It is important and fascinating to ask under what circumstances elite actors claim that exceptional circumstances warrant a breach of what they present as the normal conditions of legal, economic, and political power. An account of the 鈥榮ocial production鈥� of exceptionalism is certainly needed and Jacqueline Best must be one of the most qualified scholars to undertake such a study. But this is not the main focus in Best鈥檚 article. Instead, political economy is absorbed into a security/exceptionalism frame. In my view, this comes with great political, theoretical, and methodological costs.

Best is absolutely right that CSS is limited to the extent that it pays little to no attention to political economy. However, in adopting the concept of 鈥榯he exception鈥�, developed by Carl Schmitt precisely to evacuate class from his theory of the state, Best is in danger of doing the same. For example, the promising historical analysis of the role of martial law in assaulting labour activism quickly makes way for a summary of Michel Foucault鈥檚 bold statements about 鈥榮ecurity, economy, population鈥�. Best then endorses Foucault鈥檚 troubling analysis of the rise of neoliberalism as a reaction to the 鈥榠ncreasingly 鈥榗oercive interventions鈥欌�� of Keynesian social democracy (387). The 鈥榩roblem of the 1970s鈥�, on this account, 鈥榳as that the apparatus of security had been too aggressive in checking the dangers of a free market鈥�. Post-war state intervention in the economy 鈥榚nabled the rise of Thatcher and Reagan and, ultimately, the move towards a far more radical form of economic liberalization鈥� (387).

The complex and deeply contingent class, raced, gendered, and 鈥榩ost鈥�-colonial struggles that were part of the assault on social democracy and the rehabilitation of Hayekian economics in Chicago, Chile, then Washington and London are reduced, via Foucault, to a 鈥榝ailure鈥� of the 鈥榙elicate balance鈥� between the needs of the 鈥榝ree market鈥� and the capacity of the security apparatuses to manage its exigencies. The effective erasure of the myriad struggles that actually account for the rise of neoliberalism is probably inadvertent in this article. But it chimes with Carl Schmitt鈥檚 explicitly anti-socialist and racist political agenda when he first developed the theory of the 鈥榚xception鈥�. Leading with a Foucaultian rather than a Schmittian frame does not appear to overcome this problem. There seems to be something inherent in the analytic of 鈥榯he exception鈥� that privileges an elite political economy frame and that marginalises race and class.

This points to a bigger underlying problem with the 鈥榚xceptionalism鈥� framework. It centres almost entirely on analysing elite discourses about what they are doing in times of elite-defined emergency. The problem is not with analysing elite discourses as such. But these discourses cannot be the main validation of our theoretical and empirical claims. That would be tautology. In Best鈥檚 analysis of 鈥榚xception鈥� discourse in the 2008 financial crisis, elites are quoted making statements about the severity of a 鈥榗risis鈥�; subsequent actions are thereby 鈥榯aken out of the realm of political choice鈥� (384) to 鈥榡ustify the suspension of free market norms鈥� (385). But the argument that this discourse reflects some deep underlying logic of the exception, which is both the thing to be explained and the thing doing the explaining, is totally dependent on accepting elite terms of the crisis: that 鈥榝ree market norms鈥� were in fact operative and then suspended.

This is certainly how liberal capitalism presents itself, but that cannot be the basis of our evaluation of the financial crisis. The so-called 鈥榤arket鈥� under capital accumulation is and always has been highly managed in a deeply classed, gendered, raced, and geopolitical manner. This is not news to Jacqueline Best. However, for theories of the 鈥榚xception鈥� to add any value depends on the claim that it is in exceptional moments that governments 鈥榙ecide鈥� who is and is not worthy of protection and inclusion, who is exposed and who is excluded. Yet, this is what happens all the time in economic management, in class management, in every budget produced in every finance ministry, as well during seemingly 鈥榚xtraordinary鈥� interventions in the economy when elite interests are threatened with collapse.

At this point in the debate around the utility of 鈥榯he exception鈥� proponents claim that 鈥榯he exception has become the norm鈥�; if 鈥榝ree market norms鈥� are constantly suspended then the exception is always at work. But this defensive move is more concerned with preserving the analytic of 鈥榯he exception鈥� than analysing the phenomenon itself, in this case the politics of a financial collapse. It is not persuasive. The analytic of 鈥榚xception鈥� requires accepting that there is a politically and intellectually meaningful distinction between what is normal and exceptional. I鈥檓 not sure that gendered, raced and class-based analysis of capital accumulation allows for such a distinction, or at least makes one very difficult to justify. Jacqueline Best seems to be aware of this problem, pointing out that the main focus of the article is on 鈥榯he use of exceptionalist policies by western, industrialized states鈥�. She notes that there is a 鈥榬ich literature on the recurrence of exceptionalism in developing economies, particularly in the context of western-driven development鈥� (388).

Underlying this distinction is the claim that while there might be constant economic crises in the global South this is not so in the North or 鈥榃est鈥�. 鈥榃hile we may forget it in moments of prolonged stability鈥�, she writes, 鈥榗apitalism has always been a volatile and crisis-prone form of political economic organization鈥�. Yet, there is a 鈥榗apacity of free markets to foster the good life through economic growth and [a] tendency to massively disrupt that good life through periodic crisis鈥� (382). Here Best is trying to have it both ways, acknowledging the crisis-prone nature of capitalism while also insisting that many do live the good life and this good life can be disrupted. In the end, what has to be central to the analysis of 鈥榚xception鈥� is the appearance of 鈥榩rolonged stability鈥� for political and economic elites. Many of those same elites were shocked at the election of Trump.

Best is absolutely right that CSS is limited to the extent that it pays little to no attention to political economy. Jacqueline Best has written an important article that will provoke debate across CSS and cultural political economy. But I am not convinced that much is gained from theories of 鈥榯he exception鈥�. If the fascist origins of such theories are not enough to discredit this framing, then its dependence on elite discourses of 鈥榗risis鈥� should be enough. I understand that Best is searching for a more satisfactory framework than old-fashioned analysis of 鈥榗lass war鈥�. If the problem with such analyses, as Best claims, is that they are too 鈥榝ormalist鈥� and less able to account for the everyday workings of capitalism, then the solution is to work toward a less formalist and more empirically grounded analysis of 鈥榯he tedious ongoing work that is required to produce鈥� class, gender, racial and geopolitical hierarchy (389). I remain to be convinced that an analytic of the 鈥榚xception鈥� offers very much in that worthy endeavour.

Patricia Owens is Professor of International Relations at University of Sussex