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As the Ukraine War approaches the grim mark of three years, it appears both ripe for an armistice and impossible to bring to an end.

For US President Donald Trump, this war is a senseless waste of people and resources, which should be stopped immediately. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is an existential struggle that must prove Russia鈥檚 status as a global power of the first rank.

Ukraine鈥檚 President Volodymyr Zelensky is caught between these two incompatible visions: He doesn鈥檛 want to be taken for granted by Trump and cannot accept a humiliating compromise with the aggressor.

The gap between these positions is yawning wide, and despite the high-intensity expert debates on the , the logic of war remains dominant, and not only because of the inertia of protracted battles. The war of such scale and devastating force is a powerful transformer that has brutally damaged Ukraine and deformed Russian polity profoundly. The deal-making promoted by Trump makes perfect economic sense, but ignores the depth of these distortions and traumas.

Essentially an economic contest

Unlike a fast-moving blitzkrieg, the long war of attrition is essentially an economic contest, so there is solid rationale in Trump鈥檚 assertion that Putin is and that a continuation of the hostilities only increases the scale of disaster. The clearest indicator of troubles is inflation, which has crossed 鈥� even in official carefully doctored data 鈥� the psychologically important threshold of 10 percent. Putin may be irked by this steady weakening of rouble, but finds it an acceptable price for sustaining a . He also presumes that Trump cannot put on this apparent vulnerability.

The threat of imposing tariffs 鈥� Trump鈥檚 instrument of choice 鈥� has indeed miniscule potential impact as Russia鈥檚 export to USA is insignificant, while other coalition partners would hardly apply this unpopular measure, perhaps with the exception of the on Russian fertilizers. It takes a well-coordinated collective action to disrupt clandestine supply chains that keep Russian going, but the US policy is presently not oriented on organizing such actions. Putin may have high confidence in the performance of arms producing plants, but in fact, most of the output consist in minor upgrades on tanks and guns from old Soviet arsenals, which are .

Soldiers and military hardware

This under-supply of military hardware may become a serious problem by the end of the year, but as for the much-anticipated Trump-Putin meeting, the Russian leader about the combat capabilities of his forces. In Moscow鈥檚 perspective, every little in the Donbas battlefields adds strength to its negotiation position as a proof positive of its control of strategic initiative. The costs of this relentless offensive push are tremendous: have established the names of 91.000 soldiers killed since the start of the war, and the total figure is presumed to be twice higher. Russian high command may deem this level of losses acceptable for months to come, but what they cannot comprehend is that for Trump, the capture of one or another Ukrainian village is completely irrelevant, while the staggering casualties prompt him to place the emphasis on an .

Russian oil revenue

The Kremlin may overestimate the importance of its territorial gains, but it tends to underestimate the vulnerability of its flow of revenues from oil export. The last set of sanctions enacted by the Biden administration in the last month of its work has seriously squeezed the operations of the 鈥溾�� of tankers, and Trump has seen no reason to cancel these measures. His threat of orchestrating a drop in oil prices by both Saudi Arabia and the US investors in domestic shale fields. The EU is nevertheless encouraged to plan a on Russian oil, which is presently set on USD 60 per barrel. Ukrainian drone hits on Russian oil refineries and depots have reached a new level of accuracy and intensity since the start of 2025, and this progressing destruction of critical assets of the energy sector.

The possible summit

These blows and punches will aggravate the attrition of Russia鈥檚 war machine, but the main impact will in the second half of the year, and Putin tends to take the measure of the progress of his 鈥渟pecial military operation鈥� a week at a time. The arguments that Trump at this stage of the yet-to-be-commenced dialogue are no more persuasive for the Kremlin than the warnings from many Western leaders that failed to influence the decision to launch the aggression in February 2022.

The main value of the possible summit for Putin is in as a respectable statesman negotiating 鈥渁s equal鈥� with the US President, while for Trump, the Russian autocrat stuck with the 鈥溾�� war cannot possibly be his equal.

Anticipating an unsatisfactory outcome of the face-to-face talks, mainstream Moscow commentators have begun to about a probable over-reaction of the maverick US president, who is inclined to perceive objections as personal insults. The risk is not in resorting to nuclear blackmail, which is Putin鈥檚 game of choice, but in reaching for the lever that Trump has so far been reluctant to consider 鈥� an increase of US military support for Ukraine. Even a symbolic increase coming on the top of the of European direct and indirect aid might make a difference in turning the tide of war.

The Munich Security Conference

The initial contacts between the Trump team and Moscow have apparently yielded disappointing results, so that the set of proposals prepared in Washington D.C. needs 鈥� and therefore to allies at the Munich Security Conference. The Kremlin has been slow in confirming the fact of between Putin and Trump and merely indicated readiness to be 鈥溾�� with the mercurial US leader. The last thing Trump wants from the obviously under-prepared meeting is another lecture from Putin on Russia鈥檚 imaginary grievances and inflated demands, but there have been no hints on , even on such impossible goals as 鈥溾�� of Ukraine.

The discrepancy between Putin鈥檚 belief in victory within his grasp and Trump鈥檚 desire to stop the senseless war is only growing wider in the course of their preliminary contacts, and Zelensky is far from keen to help to bridge this gap.

Trump clearly needs a stronger hand in the forthcoming talks, but building the position of power is a complex task that requires coordination with many allies 鈥� and skills in driving a hard bargain cannot compensate for curtailed preparations.

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at 糖心网页版
• This text was first published by 11 February 2024